A bipartisan group of US senators introduced legislation on 15 July 2026 that would impose tariffs of up to 100% on exports from five countries that continue to buy Russian oil: India, China, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan.
The bill has the backing of the White House. Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut and one of the bill’s lead sponsors, said at a press conference in Washington that he believed the legislation had the support necessary to pass the Senate before August. “The decision about the exact rate will be determined by the United States Trade Representative,” Blumenthal said. “I think it will be set at an appropriate level to discourage China, India and other major purchasers of Russian oil and gas.”
The legislation is a revised version of the Sanctioning Russia Act introduced in the US Senate in April 2025, which had proposed tariffs of up to 500%. That earlier bill failed to advance due to concerns about its extreme provisions and insufficient support from President Trump. The new version lowers the proposed tariff ceiling to 100%, gives the US president waiver authority, and has reportedly secured Trump’s backing. When asked about the proposal earlier this week, Trump indicated support, noting that Senator Lindsey Graham had strongly advocated for it. Graham, who died suddenly last week, had championed the sanctions package and played a key role in advancing the current legislation before his death.
At the press conference, legislators paid tribute to Graham and said they were urging swift passage of the bill in his honour.
What the bill proposed by US senators would do
The legislation targets countries that are the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas. Beyond the import tariffs, it includes broad penalties targeting Russia’s energy, defence, financial and industrial sectors, as well as individual blocking sanctions on oligarchs, business figures and President Vladimir Putin.
Blumenthal described the tariff provisions as “targeted, narrowly limited to the five major purchasers, up to 100 percent, with waiver authority that is narrowly tailored and constricted.” He said the bill made an exception for gas purchasers who are buying less than 15% of total Russian natural gas imports and are taking significant steps to reduce their purchases, specifically noting that European nations would not be targeted.
“Our European allies are not targeted here,” Blumenthal said. Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a co-sponsor, said the new bill would have much narrower tariff provisions than the 2025 version.
The exact tariff rates would be set by the United States Trade Representative, not fixed in the legislation itself. The USTR would be directed to determine the rate necessary to discourage purchases of Russian oil and gas.
What is a secondary tariff?
What is a secondary tariff on Russian oil purchases?
A secondary tariff, sometimes called a secondary sanction, targets countries that do business with a sanctioned party rather than the sanctioned party itself. In this context, the proposed tariffs do not target Russia directly. They target India, China and the other named countries by imposing duties on their exports to the United States as a penalty for their continued purchase of Russian oil. The mechanism is designed to create an economic disincentive for third countries to continue trade with Russia, even if those countries are not themselves subject to the primary Russia sanctions regime. The US has used secondary sanctions previously in the context of Iran and North Korea.
Where India’s Russian oil purchases stand
The bill arrives as India’s imports of Russian crude oil reached a record high in June 2026. India imported Russian crude worth EUR 4.5 billion during June, a 34% increase from May, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, a Finland-based research organisation, in a report published 10 July 2026. Russian crude accounted for 83% of India’s total fossil fuel imports from Russia during June. This made India the second-largest purchaser of Russian hydrocarbons after China.
Among the biggest increases in June, Reliance Industries‘ Jamnagar refinery raised imports of Russian crude by 150% over the previous month. Indian Oil Corporation’s Paradip refinery recorded a 126% rise and Bharat Petroleum Corporation’s Kochi refinery increased purchases by 83%.
Before the Russia-Ukraine war began in February 2022, Russian oil accounted for approximately 2.5% of India’s total crude imports. By FY2024-25, that figure had risen to 35.8%, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Russia has remained India’s largest source of crude oil imports since 2023.
The economic logic is straightforward. Russia offered steep discounts to Asian buyers following Western sanctions from April 2022. Indian refiners benefited by approximately USD 12.2 per barrel compared to Brent-priced alternatives, according to Carnegie. Replacing Russian crude entirely would require India to increase dependence on Middle Eastern suppliers, raising its exposure to Strait of Hormuz supply disruption risk.
India’s position and the diplomatic background
India has consistently maintained that its energy procurement decisions are guided by national interest and energy security, not by geopolitical alignments. New Delhi has engaged diplomatically with both Western nations and Russia without formally endorsing either position in the Ukraine conflict.
The current bill is not the first US pressure mechanism applied to India over Russian oil. The US imposed a 25% secondary tariff on Indian goods in August 2025, citing continued Russian crude imports. Washington also sanctioned Russian oil companies Lukoil and Rosneft in late November 2025. Following those measures, India’s overall Russian crude imports declined: imports fell to approximately 1.24 million barrels per day in December 2025, the lowest level since December 2022, according to Kpler data.
However, state-owned refiners including Indian Oil Corporation and Bharat Petroleum continued buying Russian crude through non-sanctioned suppliers even as Reliance Industries significantly reduced its intake following the Lukoil and Rosneft sanctions. The June 2026 record high suggests that the earlier tariff pressure did not achieve a lasting reduction in Russian crude purchases.
India has also been conducting trade negotiations with the United States. The US-India trade talks have been ongoing, with an interim framework agreed in early 2026 before the US Supreme Court struck down some of Trump’s tariff powers. A formal bilateral trade deal between the two countries has not yet been concluded.
New Delhi has not issued a formal public response to the new bill as of the date of publication.
What it means for the Indian economy and the diaspora
India is the world’s third-largest consumer of crude oil. Its total imports run at approximately 4.8 to 5.0 million barrels per day. Approximately one-third of that volume has come from Russia since 2023. A 100% tariff on Indian exports to the United States, if enacted, would represent one of the most significant economic pressure events India has faced since the 1991 balance of payments crisis.
India’s goods exports to the US in FY2024-25 were valued at approximately USD 78 billion, making the US India’s largest export destination. A 100% tariff on those exports would be economically damaging far beyond the oil sector, affecting textiles, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, gems and jewellery, and technology services.
For the Indian diaspora in the United States, the economic implications of a US-India trade confrontation of this scale would be felt across the Indian-American business community, IT sector professionals, and Indian-origin entrepreneurs whose companies export to or trade between the two countries.
The waiver authority included in the bill gives the president discretion to exempt countries or categories of purchases, which is the provision New Delhi’s diplomats will focus on in the weeks ahead. India has previously negotiated waivers from US sanctions measures, including on Iranian oil purchases in 2018.
The bill has not yet been scheduled for a Senate floor vote. Its passage through the House of Representatives, where the legislative dynamics are different from the Senate, is a separate and less certain step. What is confirmed is that it has bipartisan Senate sponsorship, White House backing, and a stated target of clearing the Senate before August 2026.
What the bill means for India’s energy and trade strategy
Does this bill become law automatically if it passes the Senate?
No. Legislation must pass both the Senate and the House of Representatives before being sent to the President for signature. Senator Blumenthal expressed confidence the bill had Senate support before August. The House is a separate and less predictable legislative chamber. Even with White House backing, passage in both chambers is not guaranteed.
What is the waiver authority in the bill and how does it affect India?
The bill includes waiver authority for the US President to exempt specific countries or purchases from the tariff. Blumenthal described it as “narrowly tailored and constricted,” meaning it would not be easy to invoke but is available. India’s diplomatic strategy will focus on securing a waiver, as it did successfully with Iranian oil sanctions in 2018-19. Whether the current administration grants India a waiver depends on bilateral trade negotiations and the progress of the India-US trade deal.
Why has India not stopped buying Russian oil despite US pressure?
India’s refinery infrastructure has been optimised for Russian medium-sour crude grades since 2022-23. Switching entirely to Middle Eastern alternatives would require significant capital expenditure and would increase India’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly half of India’s current crude imports already transit. The price discount on Russian crude, approximately USD 12 per barrel below Brent at its peak, has also represented a significant saving for a country that imports approximately 85% of its oil needs. The government has described energy diversification as a strategic goal but not as an immediate operational requirement.
How has the US already pressured India on Russian oil before this bill?
The US imposed a 25% secondary tariff on Indian goods in August 2025 specifically citing Russian crude purchases. It also sanctioned Russian oil companies Lukoil and Rosneft in November 2025, which reduced the ability of some Indian refiners to access those suppliers. India’s overall Russian crude imports declined in late 2025 but recovered sharply in June 2026, reaching a record high.
What is the NRI diaspora’s exposure to this trade confrontation?
The Indian-American community is the most economically exposed. The IT sector, pharmaceutical exporters, textile and gem exporters with US operations, and Indian-origin entrepreneurs in bilateral trade would all face higher costs or reduced competitiveness if 100% tariffs on Indian exports are enacted. The specific sectors affected would depend on the final USTR determination of which goods are subject to the tariff.
